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Introduction 
 
Ever since the attacks that occurred on September 11 2001, the United States has been highly 
involved in the ‘War on Terror’. This refers to a campaign led by the United States which 
was primarily established to destroy al-Qaeda, but also focusses on other terrorist 
organisations, such as Hizballah, Hamas, and IS. The U.S. has been trying to establish an 
international campaign by establishing alliances with other Western countries to form a 
strong, international front against terrorism. Every organisation that is on the foreign terrorist 
organisation list of the United States will be submitted to the counter-terrorism measures of 
the War on Terror.  
Hizballah is an organisation that has been active in Lebanon, fighting against 
Israel under the umbrella of the Palestine-Israel conflict. However, in 1983, Hizballah 
widened its scope by attacking barracks of the United States in Lebanon and killing 241 
Americans. In addition to the attack, in its manifesto in 1985, Hizballah announced that it had 
an anti-U.S. rhetoric, because of the U.S.’s support for Israel in the Palestine-Israel conflict. 
Ever since then, the U.S. has designated the organisation as a foreign terrorist organisation, 
and has been closely watching the organisation’s movement and activity. In 1992, 
Hizballah’s presence in Latin America became known after an investigation was conducted 
because Hizballah claimed the responsibility for the attacks on the Israeli embassy in 
Argentina. The United States grew nervous, with Hizballah operating in their backyard 
causing them to fear that the organisation would start planning more attacks against them. 
However, even though more links between Latin America and Hizballah came to light years 
after the attacks on the Israeli embassy, there has been no evidence of Hizballah wanting to 
attack the U.S. The fear for Hizballah attacking however, still exists among U.S. officials 
today.  
The goal of the War on Terror is to reduce the success of terrorist organisations 
and to ultimately destroy them. The success of a terrorist organisation is perceived differently 
by many scholars in the field of terrorism studies. Some have argued that looking at the 
achievement of short-term goals is what defines the success, and that spreading fear is one of 
the main short-term goals of terrorist organisations. Some authors would thus argue that 
Hizballah can be perceived as successful because it has created fear in the U.S. This thesis 
stresses however, that this fear is not what makes Hizballah successful as a terrorist 
organisation. In this work, the success of a terrorist organisation will be measured according 
to the longevity of the organisation, which is a perspective offered by the natural systems 
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model in terrorism studies. Hizballah’s operations in Latin America have not been evolved 
around planning attacks on the U.S. Instead, they have been focussed on raising funds that are 
sent back to Lebanon to support the organisation. This thesis will thus argue that the fund-
raising activities that Hizballah has established in Latin America contribute to the survival of 
the organisation, and according to the natural systems model thus contribute to the success. 
This will be done by describing the financial activities conducted by Hizballah operatives in 
Latin American countries, and examining how the movement of the money generated from 
these activities in Latin America has contributed to the survival of the terrorist organisation in 
Lebanon. 
As stated, there are different perspectives in the field of terrorism studies as to 
what the success of a terrorist organisation might be. Some scholars examine whether actions 
executed by terrorist organisations have resulted in the achievement of their stated political 
goals. They thus perceive actions leading to this achievement as successful. In the book “Why 
Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge”, Alan M. 
Dershowitz argues that terrorism is a successful strategy because some terrorist organisations 
have managed to achieve their political objectives by using terrorism (2). Dershowitz 
supports his argument by giving the example of Palestinian terrorist organisations. He claims 
that the West rewarded these organisations by making certain concessions after terrorist 
attacks (103). Thus, he argues that since these concessions made were achievements of the 
goals of Palestinian terrorist organisations, terrorism is therefore now perceived as an 
effective tactic. Max Abrahms analysed the goals of twenty-eight terrorist organisations 
stated by the terrorists themselves as an indicator of the political goals of a terrorist 
organisation (2006, 47). He researched whether attacking civilians in a target country led to 
target governments making policy concessions, and whether that conformed to the stated 
goals of the organisations. Robert Pape researched the impact of suicide terrorism on the 
policy objectives of terrorist organisations (2003). Pape argues that the strategic logic of 
suicide terrorism is to coerce governments into making concessions (2003, 344), and thus he 
analysed all 188 suicide attacks from 1980 to 2001 to see whether they coerced the target 
governments into making significant policy changes toward the terrorists’ major political 
goals (2003, 351).  
Other scholars have looked at the more short term goals of a terrorist organisation 
as an indicator for its success. They have done so because, “when you look at the success of 
terrorism on the basis of achieving their political goals, you will almost always see that 
terrorism is likely to fail” (Lutz and Lutz 2009, 4). These scholars have looked at the success 
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of terrorism from the viewpoint of the consequences of their actions, which mostly presents 
itself as strategies that are intended to bring about a desired future. Edwin Bakker and 
Beatrice de Graaf have looked more closely at the definition of terrorism to discover how the 
success of terrorism should be perceived. They argue that, even though many scholars are 
still debating on the definition of terrorism, many would probably agree that terrorism is an 
instrument that - by way of threats and attacks - aims to create fear and anxiety and wants to 
intimidate people in order to achieve certain political goals (Bakker and De Graaf 2014, 2). 
They thus argue that spreading fear is one of the short-term goals of terrorist organisations 
(2014, 2), and the success can be measured according to the level of fear that is present in a 
target country after a terrorist attack. However, Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter argue 
that “terrorism works not simply because it instils fear in target populations, but because it 
causes governments and individuals to respond in ways that aid the terrorists’ cause” (2006, 
50). They analyse the way governments and individuals have responded by examining five 
strategies of terrorism (Kydd and Walter 2006). Reactions that governments and individuals 
give that are conform to what the terrorist organisation desire on a shorter term, is what Kydd 
and Walter describe as the success of terrorism. Another scholar that examined the strategies 
of terrorism as an indicator for its success is Christopher C. Harmon. He argued that the 
strategies adopted by terrorists include forms of construction; that is, the actions yield some 
form of progress for the group in its drive for greater power (Harmon 2001, 39). He argues 
that the argument that terrorism does not succeed is false, and proposes that the 
accompanying strategies should be the criteria for the success of terrorism (Harmon 2001, 
46). Eric D. Gould and Esteban F. Klor (2010) have looked at territorial concessions made by 
the target country after a terrorist attack. They have researched whether local terrorist attacks 
in Israel from 1988 to 2006 have caused the Israeli citizens to become more willing to grant 
territorial concessions to the Palestinians (Gould and Klor 2010, 1460). 
Finally, there are a few scholars that have taken the longevity of terrorist 
organisations as an indicator for the success of terrorism. Max Abrahms, in a later work, 
criticizes the strategic model – the paradigm in terrorism studies that proposes that terrorists 
are rational actors who attack civilians for political ends, and thus join terrorist organisations 
because they perceive it as a method to achieve political goals (Abrahms 2008, 78). This is 
the paradigm he conducted his own previously mentioned research in. However, that research 
states that terrorist organisations rarely reach their political goals and thus, Abrahms argues, 
the current model fails to explain why exactly people join terrorist organisations (2008, 94). 
He proposes a new model – the natural systems model – which states that people join terrorist 
5 
organisations for social goals (Abrahms 2008, 95). Terrorists are often people that were 
isolated from society and joined an organisation because of solidarity: when friends and 
family are in an organisation, people are likely to join a terrorist organisation as well. For 
terrorists, the survival of this almost familial-like institution is the main goal and every action 
that contributes to the survival can be perceived as success (Abrahms 2008, 103). Bruce 
Hoffman is referring to the survival of terrorist organisations as staying one step ahead of the 
counterterrorism curve (2002, 313). In order to do so, he argues, changes such as adjusting 
and adapting their tactics, modus operandi and weapons systems need to be implemented to 
overcome the barriers designed to counter the organisations activities (Hoffman 2002, 313). 
Hoffman states that the success of terrorist organisations is based on whether they are able to 
overcome these barriers and survive (2002, 313). 
In this thesis, the success of a terrorist organisation will be perceived according to 
its survival, and especially the natural systems model proposed by Max Abrahms. The 
activities that Hizballah are conducting are aimed at raising funds and in an indirect fashion, 
these activities can help the organisation achieve their goals by contributing with more 
money. However, the overlapping dimension between funds and political or short-term goals 
is too hard to examine, because money does not directly fulfil these goals, and so there are 
always other contributions to this achievement. In addition, the achievement of political or 
short-term goals would have led the focus of this thesis to be more national, since Hizballah’s 
goals are primarily focussed in Lebanon. The natural systems model however, has allowed 
this thesis to have a transnational dimension and look at overseas networks that support 
Hizballah.  
This thesis aims to relate to methodological transnationalism, which is the 
reclassification of existing data, evidence, and historical and ethnographic accounts that are 
based on bounded or bordered units, so that transnational forms and processes are revealed 
(Levitt and Khagram, 2). Transnationalism is an approach that provides a different 
perspective to certain phenomena. History as an academic field grew up alongside the nation-
state (Beckert in AHR Conversation 2006, 1446) and was characterised by ‘methodological 
nationalism’: the tendency to accept the nation-state form and even its contemporary borders 
as given (Levitt and Khagram, 6). Transnational history abandoned this approach by breaking 
out of the nation-state as a category of analysis (AHR Conversation 1441, Levitt and Glick 
Schiller 285). It broke out of the nation-state by providing an approach that focussed on a 
whole range of connections that transcend politically bounded territories and connect various 
parts of the world to one another (Beckert in AHR Conversation 2006, 1446). 
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Transnationalism is a perspective that provides movement, circulation and interpenetration 
(Bayly in AHR Conversation 2006, 1441).  
The transnational perspective has also been applied to the concept of networks. 
The increased interconnection of social and political actors involved in networks has become 
the center of attention in social sciences (Sangiovanni 2005, 7). A network can be understood 
most simply as a series of nodes that are connected through links of communication and/or 
exchange of resources (Sangiovanni 2005, 8). A transnational network thus operates on a 
transnational level and has different nodes across different parts of the world that are 
connected with each other. Nodes can include various actors such as individuals, 
organisations, firms or even computers. Recently, the concept of transnational networks has 
been moved from social and environmental movements to networks used for criminal 
purposes, among them terrorist organisations. Domestic terrorist organisations, such as 
Hizballah, create transnational dimensions by establishing overseas support networks aimed 
at raising finance, recruiting, getting weapons and other resources for the terrorists that are 
fighting the battle at home (Wilkinson 2011, 6). Combining the transnational elements of 
both a network and a terrorist organisation have led to perceiving Hizballah as a transnational 
terrorist network that has established nodes in foreign countries and that remains connected to 
these nodes by engaging in activities that transcend politically bounded borders.  
The fund-raising activities that are conducted by Hizballah’s overseas network in 
Latin America are part of the transnational perspective. In order to give a transnational 
meaning to these activities, Arjun Appadurai’s framework of ‘global scapes’ will be used. 
Appadurai argues that the new global cultural economy can no longer be understood in terms 
of existing center-periphery models (1990, 296). He argues that it needs to be understood as a 
complex, overlapping, disjunctive order; the disjuncture’s can be examined by looking at the 
relationship between five dimensions of global cultural flows. These five dimensions, or 
‘scapes’, represent movement and circulation that together create the current global cultural 
economy. The dimension that will be applied to give a transnational meaning to Hizballah’s 
financial activities in Latin America is finanscapes, or complex fiscal and investment flows 
that link economies through a global grid of currency speculation and capital transfer 
(Appadurai 1990, 298).  
In the next section, the transnational dimension of terrorism and Hizballah will be 
explained in order to provide the necessary understanding for the argument made in this 
thesis. This will be done by outlining the concept of transnational terrorism, describing the 
history and characteristics of Hizballah, and the overseas network that Hizballah created in 
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Latin America. Thereafter, the financial activities of Hizballah in Latin America that are 
known to the public will be described in detail, where after the theory of finanscapes will be 
applied to prove the transnational dimension of the fund-raising activities. Then, the 
finanscapes created by Hizballah will be linked to the survival of the organisation. This thesis 
will then conclude by stating that the contribution to the survival has led, according to the 
natural systems model, to a contribution to success. 
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Chapter 1: Hizballah as a Transnational Terrorist Organisation 
 
Hizballah’s goals have been primarily focussed on Lebanon. The organisation came into 
existence in that country and has been a representative organisation of it ever since, by having 
a political and social wing that have infiltrated in the Lebanese society. Besides this domestic 
aspect however, the organisation also developed transnational dimensions. In order to 
understand Hizballah as a transnational terrorist network, this chapter will elaborate on both 
transnational terrorism and Hizballah in detail, to reveal the overlapping dimensions of both 
phenomena. In order to provide the reader with the right understanding, the concept of 
terrorism will first be elaborated on, where after transnational terrorism and Hizballah will be 
mentioned in detail. 
 
Terrorism and Transnationalism 
In the field of terrorism studies, there is lack of agreement on a clear and well-known 
definition of terrorism. According to Alex Schmid, there are four reasons why it is notably 
difficult to come to a definition (2004). First, he argues that terrorism is a contested concept: 
“one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”. Some might want to include certain 
aspects in the definition, while others wish to not do so. Second, terrorism has many different 
forms and manifestations, and it is a struggle to find a definition that includes all of them. 
Third, the nature of terrorism has changed in the past 200 years. Finally, using a definition 
will delegitimize and criminalize certain groups, which can lead to unwanted association with 
terrorism. It is difficult for groups to lose the classification of terrorism once received, and it 
can thus unintentionally harm those groups. The absence of an agreed-upon definition of 
terrorism has indeed led to terrorism being applied to a variety of acts of violence which are 
not strictly terrorism by definition (Jenkinks 1980, 1). If there would be an agreement on a 
definition, this would facilitate communication between researchers, their organisations and 
their contribution to society’s counter-terrorism measures (Bruce 2013, 27). 
As a result of having no agreement on a definition of terrorism, most people have 
a vague idea or impression of what terrorism is (Schmid 2004, 378). In order to avoid 
conceptual confusion, the definition of terrorism chosen in this thesis will be briefly outlined. 
In his book “Terrorism versus Democracy”, Paul Wilkinson describes different definitions of 
terrorism proposed, among which the definitions according to the UK legislation in the 
Terrorism Act, and by the US Government. Wilkinson manages to give a thorough 
description of the different aspects of the concept of terrorism and comes to the following 
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definition himself: “terrorism is the systematic use of coercive intimidation, usually to service 
political ends. It is used to create and exploit a climate of fear amongst a wider target group 
than the immediate victims of the violence, and to publicise a cause as well as to coerce a 
target to acceding to the terrorists’ aims. Terrorism may be used on its own or as part of a 
wider unconventional war. It can be employed by desperate and weak minorities; by states as 
a tool of domestic and foreign policy, or by belligerents as an accompaniment in all types and 
stages of warfare” (Wilkinson 2010, 17). 
Terrorism as a violent strategy has manifested itself in different ways throughout 
history. According to David Rapoport, modern terrorism emerged in the 1880s and from then 
on manifested itself in four waves (2002). Each wave reflects terrorism’s most dominant 
features, as terrorism has a continuously changing nature. The Anarchist wave, the first wave, 
lasted from the 1880s until the 1920s, and characterized itself by assassinations against 
political figures. The Anti-colonial wave lasted until the 1960s, and groups in this wave 
operated more on a guerrilla, underground basis against colonial powers. The New Left wave 
was dominated by groups in the developed world that saw themselves as vanguards for the 
masses in the Third World. It was during this wave that the abandoned term “international 
terrorism” revived (Rapoport 2002, 58). The Religious wave began in 1979 and characterizes 
itself by terrorist groups that are driven by religion and use suicide bombing as a tactic. In 
addition, terrorist groups in the Religious wave use globalization even further to a point 
where almost every terrorist organisation can be called international, or transnational. 
The history of transnational terrorism is parallel to that of international terrorism. 
Even though in the 1980s, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that there was a 
slight difference between transnational and international terrorism (Jenkins 1980, 4), the two 
terms are now used intertwined. Transnational terrorism emerged in the late 1960s, early 
1970s (Selth 1987; Cronin 2002/3), when at the same time in different parts of the world a 
number of terrorist movements emerged that executed international attacks or aimed for 
international goals (Selth 1987, 68). As some of these organisations achieved international 
successes, other groups were encouraged to follow the same path. This caused an enormous 
growth in terrorism: between 1968 and 1981 more than 670 different groups claimed 
responsibility for at least one international terrorist incident (Selth 1987, 69). Transnational 
terrorism describes terrorism conducted with the support of a foreign government or 
organisation, directed at foreign nationals, institutions or governments, or which other ways 
directly transcends national boundaries (Selth 1987, 66). As mentioned before, domestic 
terrorist organisations can create transnational dimensions by creating overseas support 
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networks aimed at raising finance, recruiting, getting weapons and other resources for the 
terrorists that are fighting the battle at home (Wilkinson 2011, 6).   
The differences between the more traditional forms of terrorism (the national 
groups such as the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain and the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia) and the transnational terrorist groups 
(such as Al Qaeda) are evident in some central aspects of terrorism. First of all, the 
transnational terrorist organisations adopted mass killing in foreign countries as a party of 
their strategy, while the more traditional, terrorist organisations generally attacked in one 
country or region (Wilkinson 2011, 8). Second, most of the transnational terrorist 
organisations desire to change the entire international system, while the more traditional 
organisations had more national interests and goals (Wilkinson 2011, 8). Third, transnational 
organisations also use terrorism as a form of theatre: “terrorists want a lot of people watching 
and a lot of people listening, not a lot of people dead” (Jenkins 1975, 158). The amount of 
news coverage the international media grants to certain organisations after an attack, gives 
the organisations attention. By doing this, the international media portrays organisations 
stronger as they really are, and this spreads fear and alarm among populations (Jenkins 1975, 
158). Finally, while traditional organisations only had funding and recruitment networks 
abroad, transnational terrorist organisations tend to have affiliates, cells and support groups in 
foreign countries (Wilkinson 2011, 8). Often these cells or networks execute attacks, in 
addition to recruiting and raising funds in the name of the terrorist organisation. 
 
Hizballah: ‘the Party of God’ 
‘Hizb Allah’, which means the ‘Party of God’ in Arabic, is a terrorist organisation that has its 
origin in Lebanon and consists of members of the Shi'a (Shiites) Muslims. The Shi’a Muslims 
are the second largest denomination of Islam, behind the Sunni Muslims, which are thus often 
in a majority. In Lebanon, however, the Shi’a Muslims were the largest sect by the 1960s 
(Jaber 1997, 11). But, while the rest of Lebanon flourished economically, the Shiites lacked 
the basic necessities of modern life and had no political representation since they were 
neglected by the Lebanese government (Jaber 1997, 11). The organisation came into 
existence when the fight between the Palestinians and the Israelis moved beyond the borders 
of Israel and reached the habitat of many Shiites; the South of Lebanon.  
The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) began making the region its base 
from where it made raids into Israel (Jaber 1997, 12). The PLO became a state-within-a-state 
in the South of Lebanon and its officials were accused of rape, robbery and extortion (Jaber 
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1997, 14). So at first, when Israel invaded the South in 1978 with the primary goal of driving 
the PLO out, the Shiites showed their gratitude towards the Israelis (Jaber 1997, 14). 
However, when Israel invaded for the second time in 1982, and was reluctant to leave despite 
having achieved its primary goal of driving the PLO out, a change in attitude occurred among 
the Shiites (Jaber 1997, 15). In 1985, young Shiite men and clerics announced the existence 
of Hizballah and the formation of its military wing, the Islamic Resistance, by claiming the 
responsibility of the attack by a young man who drove a red pick-up Chevrolet containing 
900 kilograms of explosives into a military Israeli convoy (Jaber 1997, 24). 
In 1985 Hizballah presented its manifesto in which the norms, values, and goals 
of the organisation were stated. The manifesto described its anti-Israel discourse, and 
explained that the organisation was against all oppressors, and for all oppressed (Alagha 
2011, 15). Its grievances against the United States were based on their support of the Israeli 
invasion in 1982, and its aim was to unite all Muslims and to create an Islamic State in 
Lebanon (Alagha 2011, 17). They would defend these goals by executing the smaller military 
jihad: fighting against all enemies of Islam (Alagha 2011, 21). In 2009, Hizballah introduced 
a new manifesto, but the main principles remained the same. 
After 1989, Hizballah made a transition from a predominantly militant movement 
that fought Israel to greater participation in the formal institutions of the Lebanese state. First 
of all, Hizballah started participating in the political system of Lebanon. One of Hizballah’s 
objectives was to create an Islamic State, and it was believed that a revolutionary transition to 
Islamic rule and an Islamic state was impossible in the diverse Lebanese society. Gradual 
reformation was thus necessary, which required participating in the political system (Norton 
2007, 99). The idea of Hizballah participating in the political system was widely supported by 
the Shi’a community, since they always lacked a certain form of political representation. In 
the 1992 elections, Hizballah captured twelve seats in the Lebanese parliament and has 
maintained almost always 10 percent of all parliamentary seats in elections ever since 
(Norton 2007, 102). 
Secondly, Hizballah has created a large social wing in order to help Lebanese 
citizens. When the Shiites fled the South of Lebanon because of the invasion of the PLO to 
the North, they mostly settled in suburbs of Beirut (Jaber 1997, 145). The living conditions 
were poor and the government did not undertake anything to improve the situation. In the 
meantime, the suburbs of Beirut had become a Hizballah bastion, where its leadership lived 
and worked (Jaber 1997: 146). As the years passed, and the government still refused to 
improve the living condition of the refugees in the north, Hizballah decided to tackle the 
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situation itself (Jaber 1997, 147). With the financial help of Iran, Hizballah established Jihad 
al-Binaa, Construction Jihad, in 1984. This social wing of the organisation set up various 
public services, such as schools, hospitals, infrastructure, community centers, mosques and 
other public assistance facilities. At first, the social programs were created for the Shiite 
Muslims that lived in the north of Lebanon. However the programs are now available to the 
poor of other religious sects, which has improved the position of Hizballah in the political 
sphere and increased popular support (Jaber 1997, 148). 
 
Hizballah as a Transnational Terrorist Organisation 
In addition to becoming a more political and social institution, Hizballah became a 
transnational terrorist organisation that has created ties in various countries. These ties are 
mainly aimed at raising funds, which can be related to state sponsorship that Hizballah 
receives from Iran. According to the country Reports on Terrorism, Iran has been sponsoring 
Hizballah from the beginning of its existence with training, weapons, explosives, as well as 
political, diplomatic, monetary and organisational aid (2012, 260). But even though Iran’s 
sponsorship is probably the largest source of funding, with an estimated amount of 200 
million U.S. dollars, the organisation leaves itself accountable to the wishes of the sponsor 
state (Philippone 2008, 18). Thus, whenever Hizballah’s actions are not in accordance with 
Iran’s desires, there is insecurity that either Iran can stop the sponsorship, or might force 
Hizballah to follow another course (Philippone 2008, 18). In addition to that, the War on 
Terror has led the West trying to persuade state sponsors of terrorism to stop. Hizballah likely 
wants to ensure that even in the event that Iran were to ever strike a grand bargain with the 
West, the group would continue to be able to exist and function on its own.  
The ties that Hizballah created are mostly in two regions: Africa and Latin 
America. In the former, Hizballah has made millions of dollars from the illicit sale of 
diamonds (Arena 2006, 467). In Sierra Leone, Hizballah has a network of rebel groups 
operating that mine the diamonds for them (Arena 2006, 467). In the Congo, Hizballah is 
reported to take a direct role in the market by purchasing diamonds from miners and local 
merchants at a fraction of the market value and selling them in Antwerp, Bombay and Dubai 
(Arena 2006, 468). However, it remains unclear how much revenue Hizballah is generating 
from the diamond trade.  
In Latin America, Hizballah has mostly been present in the Tri-Border Area 
(TBA). The TBA consists of three cities in a 40-square-kilometer triangle: Ciudad del Este in 
Paraguay, Foz do Iguaçu in Brazil, and Puerto Iguazú in Argentina. One of the main 
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attractions is the Iguassú Falls, which attract many tourists every year. In the early 1970s, 
when Brazil and Paraguay were seeking to exploit the energy-generating and tourist potential 
of Iguassú Falls and promote regional trade, government planners established a free-trade 
zone in the rapidly growing city of Ciudad del Este, thereby allowing Argentines and 
Brazilians to purchase cheap electronic products (Hudson 2003, 6). Because of this, the 
region became duty-free and almost lawless, from which organised crime groups, terrorist 
organisations and corrupt officials profit. It is estimated that Islamic fundamentalist groups in 
the TBA send between 300 million and 500 million U.S. dollars a year in profits from drug 
trafficking, arms dealing, and other illegal activities, including money laundering, 
contraband, and product piracy, to radical Islamic groups in the Middle East (Hudson 2003, 
4). Hizballah has been using the area as a safe haven for fundraising, money laundering, 
recruitment, training, plotting and other activities ever since. By 2005, an estimated 460 
operatives worked for numerous Hizballah cells in the TBA (Noriega and Cárdenas 2011, 1). 
A 2009 study by the RAND Corporation estimated that Hizballah earns about 20 million U.S. 
dollars a year from illicit activities in the region (Knott 2014, 53).  
Besides this area, Hizballah has been establishing support networks in various 
other countries in Latin America. It is for example known that in Colombia, Hizballah has 
been establishing connections with the FARC because of Colombian cocaine. It appears as if 
Hizballah is trying to get in on the well-established drug trafficking practices of the FARC. In 
Mexico, connections between Hizballah and the drug cartel Los Zetas have come to light. 
Similar to its connections with FARC, it appears as if Hizballah is trying to cooperate with 
Los Zetas in order to use their drug trade routes that cross the Mexico-U.S. border. In 
addition to establishing fund-raising activities with the help of their drug-trade routes, it also 
appears that Hizballah is recruiting members of the Los Zetas gang to participate in activities 
that support Hizballah. Both links with the FARC and Los Zetas will come to light in the next 
section. In Argentina, a large recruiting network known as the Rabbani network has been 
spreading its influence into other countries, such as Venezuela, Brazil and Chile (Noriega and 
Cárdenas 2011, 4). Especially Brazil, where some 1 million Muslims live, has been very 
attractive for the recruitment practices of the network. On Margarita Island, an island 60 
kilometres off the coast of Venezuela, Hizballah established paramilitary training camps 
whence Venezuelans that were recruited were sent back to Lebanon after completing the 
training programme (Noriega and Cárdenas 2011, 3). 
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Conclusion 
Transnational terrorism emerged in the late 1960s, when a number of terrorist movements 
executed international attacks or aimed for the achievement of international goals. 
Transnational terrorism can either be terrorism conducted with the support of a foreign 
government or organisation directed at foreign nationals; institutions or governments, or 
which other ways directly transcends national boundaries, or it can be a domestic terrorist 
organisation that creates overseas support networks. Hizballah, which came into existence 
when the fight between the Palestinians and the Israelis moved towards the South of 
Lebanon, has been a domestic terrorist organisation since it has been participating in the 
formal institutions of the Lebanese state. Hizballah has been participating in the political 
system of Lebanon and has created large social wings in order to help poor Lebanese citizens. 
However, Hizballah also developed itself as a transnational terrorist organisation. First of all, 
Hizballah has been receiving support from Iran since the beginning of its existence in the 
form of material, political, diplomatic, monetary and organisational aid. Secondly, the 
organisation has established foreign support networks that have contributed to the 
organisation in the form of raising funds and attracting recruits. Hizballah can thus be 
perceived as a domestic terrorist organisation that has developed into a transnational terrorist 
network by having both state sponsorship of a foreign country and overseas support networks 
in foreign countries.  
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Chapter 2: Hizballah’s Financial Ties with Latin America 
 
As concluded in the foregoing chapter, Hizballah is a transnational terrorist organisation 
because it has established overseas support networks. Even though some activities that have 
been established by Hizballah operatives in Latin America are aimed at recruitment, most of 
them are aimed at raising funds for the organisation. This chapter will argue that these fund-
raising activities are part of the transnational world by being finanscapes and that they 
contributed to the survival of the organisation. First, some of Hizballah’s fund-raising 
activities in Latin America will be described in detail, where after the relation between them, 
finanscapes and the survival of Hizballah will be assessed.  
 
Hizballah’s Financial Activities 
In the following section, the financial activities that Hizballah has established with the help of 
Latin American citizens will be described. This will give insight into how these people and 
networks have operated and what kind of activities they were involved in. The cases that will 
be described are made public due to arrests and investigations. This means that there might be 
more cases of financial activities conducted by Hizballah in Latin America that are not 
known to the public. In addition, there is also the possibility that there might be activities 
aimed at gaining weapons or other sorts of materials that could contribute to the survival of 
the organisation. This link will remain unexplored since there is no information available. 
This thesis recognizes that the cases that will be described below are not fully responsible for 
the survival of the organisation, but rather contribute to a part of it.  
 
The Tri-Border Area 
The largest network operating in the TBA is the Barakat network. Assad Ahmad Barakat 
immigrated to Paraguay at the age of 17 with his father to escape the Lebanese civil war 
(Arena 2006, 460). A couple of years after Assad Ahmad Barakat immigrated to Paraguay, he 
opened an electronics wholesale store in a stall at the Page shopping gallery in Ciudad del 
Este called Casa Apollo, and an import-export business called Barakat Ltd. He used both 
these as front companies to operate a variety of illegal fund-raising operations (Arena 2006, 
460). Barakat used his shop in the Page gallery to sell huge quantities of pirated software 
smuggled into the region from Hong Kong. Paraguayan authorities learnt that Barakat had set 
up shipment routes by sea and by air, when they found 5,000 pirated Nintendo video games 
worth 160,000 U.S. dollars in Bolivia and Paraguay, through which he moved the 
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merchandise from the Chilean port city of Iquique to his shop in Ciudad del Este (Arena 
2006, 460). 
Together with family members and trusted contacts, Barakat set up an extensive 
network of legal and illicit financial ventures and became the chief fund-raiser for Hizballah 
in the TBA (Constanza 2012, 197). Barakat’s cousin, Bassam Naboulsi, was arrested in 2003 
in Brazil for having ties with a group of drug traffickers. His brother, Hassan Naboulsi, 
owned Hassan Internacional which was located in the Page shopping gallery in Ciudad del 
Este, where Barakat also operated. In 2003, Hassan Abdallah Dayoub, Barakat’s other cousin 
who lived in Ciudad del Este, was arrested at Asunción’s Silvio Pettirossi Airport, while in 
possession of 2.3 kilograms of cocaine hidden in an electric piano. More recently, the New 
York Times reported that Barakat’s brother, Hamzi Ahmed Barakat was arrested in Brazil 
under suspicion of operating a fraudulent scheme in the clothing industry (2013). He used the 
identities of newly arrived Lebanese immigrants in Brazil to set up front companies that 
helped him legitimize his funding for Hizballah.  
A RAND Corporation report noted that Barakat and his network raised a 
substantial amount of money for Hizballah through counterfeiting, piracy, racketeering, 
narcotics trafficking, money laundering, weapons trafficking and document forgery services 
(Constanza 2012, 197). On 12 September 2001, a Paraguayan SWAT team raided Casa 
Apollo. Even though Barakat managed to escape arrest, the SWAT team found financial 
statements that added up to a quarter of a million dollars in monthly money transfers sent to 
the Middle East (Constanza 2012, 197). Among the statements was a letter from Hizballah 
leader Hassan Nasrallah congratulating Barakat on his fund-raising efforts while 
acknowledging a receipt of over 3.5 million U.S. dollars for the year 2000 (Constanza 2012, 
197).  
Two other cases in the TBA concern Ali Khalil Mehri and Moussa Ali Hamdan. 
Mehri is a businessman of Lebanese descent that lived in Ciudad del Este. He was charged 
with piracy of computer software and compact disks, selling millions of dollars’ worth of 
counterfeit software, and funnelling the profits to Hizballah (Arena 2006, 460). Mehri had 
exploited the weak and corrupt Paraguayan intellectual property rights laws in 1998 by 
registering the brand Play Station, which was manufactured legitimately by Sony (Meehan 
2004, 30). Merchants that wanted to sell the registered product Play Station then needed to 
pay for it, and this money went straight to Mehri, who funnelled it back to Hizballah in 
Lebanon. Hamdan is a Lebanese national that operated from Ciudad del Este and was 
arrested by Interpol in 2010. He was arrested for transporting and trafficking stolen goods in 
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addition to making false statements to government officials (Constanza 2012, 198). Together 
with his accomplices, Hamdan sold fraudulent passports and counterfeit money to raise funds 
that were used in an attempt to buy 1,200 M4 Colt machine guns for Hizballah (Constanza 
2012, 198). 
 
Colombia 
The largest network operating from Colombia is the Joumaa network. Ayman Joumaa, or 
“Junior”, is a Lebanese-Colombian criminal that has established a drug trafficking network 
that is based in Colombia but links South America to Mexico, the U.S., West Africa and 
Europe (Knott 2014, 54). The network is mainly involved in selling thousands of kilograms 
of cocaine to the Mexican drug cartel Los Zetas, and for laundering millions of dollars in 
drug money from Mexico, Europe and West Africa to Colombia and Venezuela. The network 
uses bulk cash smuggling and Lebanese exchange houses to launder the illicit profits made 
from the drug trafficking. The Lebanese Canadian Bank and other financial institutions 
served as conduits for money laundering and the funding of Hizballah (Knott 2014, 54).  
Within the Joumaa network, more Lebanese immigrants engaged in activities that 
supported the network. The Treasury Department of the United States sanctioned Lebanese, 
Colombian and Venezuelan individuals and businesses that laundered money for Joumaa, 
including numerous front companies that hid the profits’ true destinations (Knott 2014, 56). 
Ali Mohamad Saleh was the leader of a support cell in Colombia that raised funds for transfer 
to Hizballah. According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Saleh solicited donations for 
Hizballah from business owners and residents, and coordinated the transfer of checks and 
U.S. dollars by courier from Colombia via Venezuela to Hizballah in Lebanon (2012). In 
addition to that, Saleh is a former Hizballah fighter and thus had significant knowledge of 
Hizballah operation plans due to his contact with Hizballah authorities in Lebanon (U.S. 
Department of the Treasury 2012). In 2012, the Treasury Department designated Kassem 
Mohamad Saleh, who is a dual citizen of Lebanon and Venezuela for running front 
companies for Joumaa; Abbas Hussein Harb, who is also a dual citizen of Lebanon and 
Venezuela for owning a Colombia- and Venezuela-based organisation that launders money 
for Joumaa via the Lebanese financial sector, and Ibrahim Chibli, only a citizen of Lebanon 
for using his organisation to launder money for the network (Knott 2014, 56). Kassem 
Mohamad Saleh’s brother, Ali Mohamad Saleh, is a Lebanese-Colombian national who also 
engaged in fund-raising activities for Hizballah in the Joumaa network. 
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As mentioned before, Hizballah has been creating ties with the FARC because of 
its large share in the Colombian cocaine market. This link was revealed after Operation Titan, 
a two-year drug trafficking investigation in 2008 conducted by U.S. and Colombian 
investigators that dismantled an international cocaine smuggling and money-laundering 
network that ranged from Colombia to Panama, Mexico, the U.S., Europe and the Middle 
East (Constanza 2012, 200). Colombian and U.S. agents arrested 130 people and seized 23 
million U.S. dollars. Among those arrested in Bogota, Colombia, was Chekry Harb, a 
Lebanese man who used the alias “Taliban”. He was a world-class money launderer whose 
hub of South American cocaine traffickers and Middle Eastern militants laundered hundreds 
of millions of dollars per year for various criminal organisations and Middle Eastern radical 
groups (Constanza 2012, 200). His organisation supposedly paid some 12 percent of their 
profits to Hizballah.  
 
Venezuela 
In addition to the TBA and Colombia, a large network was also present in Venezuela: the 
Nassereddine Network. Ghazi Atef Salameh Nassereddine was born in Lebanon but became a 
Venezuelan citizen in 2001. Soon after he immigrated, he became Venezuela’s second-
ranking diplomat in Syria (Noriega and Cárdenas 2011, 3). He was the most prominent 
Hizballah supporter in Venezuela because of his diplomatic role and his close relationship to 
Justice and Interior Minister of Venezuela at that time, Tarik El Aissami. Together with his 
two brothers, Nassereddine manages a network that aims to expand Hizballah’s influence in 
Venezuela and throughout Latin America.  
Within the Nassereddine network, Ghazi Nassereddine has built and consolidated 
relationships with Hizballah officials in both Lebanon and Syria (Noriega and Cárdenas 
2011, 3). His brother, however, has been more concerned with fund-raising activities. 
Abdallah runs various money-laundering operations and manages much of the business 
dealings of Hizballah in Latin America. He operates from Margarita Island, a small island 60 
kilometres off the coast of Venezuela, housing a large Shi’a population (Constanza 2012, 
199). He has been using his position as the former Vice President of the Federation of Arab 
and American Entities in Latin America to maintain ties with Islamic communities 
throughout the region (Noriega and Cárdenas 2011, 3).  
Two other cases in Venezuela are those of Ghazi Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kan’an. 
Ghazi Nasr al Din is a Lebanese-Venezuelan diplomat and was president of Caracas’s Shi’a 
Islamic Center. He served as Venezuela’s Chargé d’Affaires in its embassy in Syria until 
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2008 and as the Director of Political Aspects at its embassy in Lebanon (Knott 2014, 58). He 
was identified in 2008 by the U.S. Department of the Treasury as a Hizballah supporter who 
used his position to provide financial support to the organisation (Constanza 2012, 200). Al 
Din also used built up relationships with Hizballah officials in Lebanon. From there, he 
facilitated the travel of two Hizballah representatives to Caracas so that they could raise funds 
in Venezuela (Constanza 2012, 200). These representatives additionally helped him with 
opening a Hizballah-sponsored community center and office in Venezuela (Knott 2014, 58). 
As the president of the Islamic Center in Caracas, al Din used his position to facilitate 
fundraising by counselling Hizballah donors on fundraising efforts and providing them with 
specific information on bank accounts where the donors’ deposits would go directly to 
Hizballah (Knott 2014, 58). Fawzi Kan’an is a Lebanese-Venezuelan businessman, who 
moved to Venezuela from Lebanon in 1986 to escape the fighting of the Lebanese civil war. 
He set up two travel agencies in Venezuela: Biblos Travel Agency and Hilal Travel Agency 
and according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, he has used both companies to courier 
funds raised in Venezuela to Lebanon and to facilitate the travel of Hizballah members to 
Venezuela (Constanza 2012, 200).  
 
Other Countries 
In 2005, an international drug ring was dismantled in Ecuador under Operation Damascus. 
The ring trafficked cocaine to Europe, Asia, and South American countries. The ring was led 
by Rady Zaiter, a Lebanese man who used his restaurant in the capital city as a front for the 
operation. The cocaine was transported in shipments of 1 million U.S. dollar a piece, by 
hiding it in suitcases equipped with false bottoms and in the stomachs of drug couriers (Arena 
2006, 463). According to an internal police report, evidence collected in the case indicated up 
to 70 percent of the drug ring’s profits were funnelled to Hizballah (Arena 2006, 463).  
In Brazil, Hizballah has been approaching the Shi’a community of 20,000 that 
live in the capital, São Paulo. Hizballah is reportedly supporting some of these immigrants by 
staking them 50,000 U.S. dollars to establish businesses in exchange for a percentage of sales 
(Constanza 199). The businesses established will thus serve as front companies that will 
support Hizballah by moving money from Brazil to Lebanon. 
 
Hizballah’s Finanscapes 
The networks that Hizballah has created in various Latin American countries have been 
engaged in different fund-raising activities. There have been cases of piracy, for example in 
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the Barakat Network and Ali Khalil Mehri both in the Tri-Border Area. Some have been 
engaged in drug trafficking, for example the Barakat Network in the TBA, the Joumaa 
Network in Colombia, Chekry Harb as the leader of a South American cocaine traffickers 
hub and Rady Zaiter that led the international drug ring that was dismantled in Ecuador. 
Others have solicited donations, among others Ali Mohamed Salah, who solicited donations 
for Hizballah from business owners and residents, and Ghazi Nasr al Din, who used his 
diplomat position to counsel Hizballah donors on fundraising efforts. Some others were 
engaged in fraud, weapons trafficking, document forgery services and transporting and 
trafficking of stolen goods. 
The money these networks have generated is sent back to the leadership of 
Hizballah in Lebanon. Creating this movement of money has been executed in a few steps. At 
first, the money gained from illicit activities needs to be laundered. This is often done with 
front companies, such as Casa Apollo and Barakat Ltd in the Barakat network, Lebanese 
exchange houses and the Lebanese Canadian Bank in the Joumaa network, travel agencies 
Biblos Travel Agency and Hilal Travel Agency set up by Ghazi Nasr al Din and a restaurant 
used by Rady Zaiter, the leader of the Ecuadorian drug ring. Second, after laundering the 
money, it would be funnelled to Hizballah in Lebanon. This could be done by transferring the 
money into bank accounts that were directly associated with Hizballah, for example by using 
the Lebanese Canadian Bank, by gaining donors that transferred money directly into those 
bank accounts, or by using human couriers that smuggled certain amounts of money across 
the border to Lebanon. The front companies would often be used to transfer the money so 
that authorities would have difficulties in finding the true origin of the money. 
This movement of money from Latin America to Lebanon is what Arjun 
Appadurai calls a finanscape: a fiscal flow that links economies together through capital 
transfer. The money that Hizballah generates in Latin America can be depicted as finanscapes 
because of two reasons. First of all, the money is transferred from a Latin American country 
to Lebanon. This means that the money creates a tie between two countries, and thus there is 
a form of financial connectedness that links economies together. Secondly, the money is 
being moved from one place to another and thus represents a capital flow that transcends the 
border of a nation. The movement of the money from one place to another is, according to 
Appadurai, a contribution to the global cultural economy that is made up of flows. Hizballah 
thus contributes to the transnational world by creating finanscapes from Latin American 
countries to Lebanon. 
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Hizballah’s Survival 
The positive relationship between terrorist financing and the survival of a terrorist 
organisation is acknowledged by political entities in the world. In 1999, The United Nations 
General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism. This Convention was aimed at enhancing international co-operation among 
states in devising and adopting effective measures for the prevention of the financing of 
terrorism, as well as for its suppression through the prosecution and punishment of its 
perpetrators (Abeyratne 2011, 58). After September 11, George W. Bush put new emphasis 
on countering terrorist financing under the umbrella of the War on Terror in order to shut 
down terrorist organisations. It was revealed after investigations that the money trail leading 
from the hijackers who were involved in the attacks on September 11 not only helped 
establish their political origins but also served to expose all too clearly the vulnerabilities of 
the international banking system to terrorist fund generation, money laundering and general 
financial logistics (Navias 2002, 57). Countering terrorist financing is called ‘finance 
warfare’, or the form of economic warfare whose context is the global financial markets and 
whose aim is to constrain the enemy’s capability both to generate funds and to shift monies 
across borders for the purposes of supporting and sustaining international operations (Navias 
2002, 57). It has been put on the forefront of countermeasures because it is believed that if all 
financial support for a network can be disrupted, the network will shut down through an 
inability to operate (Knott 2014, 62). Terrorist financing is thus perceived as the motor of a 
terrorist organisation: without it, an organisation would not be able to buy weapons, plan 
attacks, travel, establish foreign networks and maintain various wings. Having no funds will 
‘dry-out’ an organisation, and shut down its ability to operate. Funds thus contribute to the 
survival of a terrorist organisation, since without money, it would be hard for an organisation 
to maintain its existence and operate. 
Hizballah has been able to create a steady stream of finanscapes that have 
contributed to the survival of its political, social and military wing in Lebanon. These wings 
are the core of the organisation’s existence, and the networks in foreign countries have been 
established to maintain these. The amount of money sent back to Lebanon differed per 
network. Some networks have sent only a certain percentage back to Hizballah, such as the 
hub of Chekry Harb, who payed some 12 percent of their profits to Hizballah, and the drug 
ring led by Rady Zaiter in Ecuador, who funnelled up to 70 percent of the profits to 
Hizballah. Either way, the amounts of money that are sent back are of a substantial amount; 
the Barakat network alone raised over 3.5 million U.S. dollars for the year 2000. These 
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amounts have thus greatly contributed to the maintenance of Hizballah’s political, social and 
military wing. The money generated in Latin America has contributed to the survival of these 
wings by making it able to run political programmes and campaigns, to afford the 
establishment of social programmes and public services, and to buy weapons and establish 
training camps. The amounts of money generated in Latin America are of such substantial 
proportion that without it, the organisation would have more trouble maintaining the 
existence and the ability to operate of its wings. 
 
Conclusion 
The cases of financial activities that are known because of arrests and investigations have 
displayed the variety of methods that Hizballah operatives have used to raise funds for the 
organisation. The amounts of money raised were of substantial amount, and this money is 
(partially) sent back to Lebanon with the help of front companies and couriers. The 
movement of money across national borders, and the interconnection it creates between 
multiple economies, have resulted in these fund-raising activities becoming a part of the 
transnational world as finanscapes. 
Terrorist financing is acknowledged to have a positive relationship with the 
survival of a terrorist organisation, because it is believed that if an organisation does not 
receive any financial support, it will shut down through the ability to operate. The 
finanscapes created by Hizballah have caused the money generated in Latin America to travel 
to Lebanon, where it has supported the three main wings of the organisation. Since the 
finanscapes are of a substantial amount of money, it facilitated the maintaining of existence 
of its wings and its ability to operate. Thus, the finanscapes created with Latin American 
countries have contributed to the survival of Hizballah.  
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Conclusion 
 
Hizballah can be perceived as a domestic terrorist organisation because it has established 
military, political and social wings that are focussed on the development of Lebanon. 
Especially the latter two have caused Hizballah to be more integrated in the formal 
institutions of the state. However, the organisation has also established transnational 
dimensions when it received state sponsorship from Iran and when it started establishing 
foreign support networks in Africa and Latin America. The support networks in Latin 
America have mostly been focussed on generating funds, and this has been done by using 
various methods such as drug trafficking, piracy, trading in stolen goods and others. The 
funds generated in Latin America would then be sent back to the leadership of the 
organisation in Lebanon. This is often done with the help of front companies that launder the 
money and legitimize the money trail. The money would either be transferred to bank 
accounts in Lebanon, or would be smuggled across borders by using human couriers. The 
movement of the money from across national borders, and the financial interconnection it 
creates between multiple economies, is why these fund-raising activities have turned into 
finanscapes. The creation of these finanscapes has led Hizballah to be a contributor to the 
transnational world. 
The finanscapes created by Hizballah have caused the money generated in Latin 
America to travel to Lebanon, where it has supported the three main wings of the 
organisation. The money raised with these activities are not as large as the 200 million U.S. 
dollar that the organisation received from Iran. However, the 20 million U.S. dollars 
generated from the Tri-Border Area and the 3.5 million U.S. dollars generated from the 
Barakat network in one year are good examples that show that the amounts are definitely of 
substantial size. Even though the amounts are not the same as the Iranian sponsorship, the 
money is of substantial size that without it, the organisation would have had more trouble 
maintaining the existence and the ability to operate of its wings in Lebanon. The finanscapes 
that Hizballah has created in Latin America thus contribute to the survival of the 
organisation. 
The natural systems model in terrorism posits that people join terrorist 
organisations for social socials. They see the organisation as a familial-like institution and 
their main goal is to maintain the survival of the organisation. According to the model, every 
action that contributes to the survival can be perceived as success. Thus, according to the 
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natural systems model, the financial activities that Hizballah has established in Latin 
America, and that have contributed to the transnational world by being finanscapes, have 
contributed to the success of Hizballah, because they can be perceived as actions that have 
contributed to the survival of the organisation. 
The War on Terror’s main aim has been to reduce the success of terrorist 
organisations and to ultimately destroy them. Hizballah’s ties with Latin America have 
undermined these objectives because the evidence provided in this thesis proves that the 
organisation’s financial activities have contributed to the success of the organisation ever 
since its presence in Latin America became known in 1992. Transnational terrorism emerged 
when a number of terrorist organisations started executing international attacks or aimed for 
international goals because they have seen other organisations achieving international success 
with these methods. Terrorist organisations can thus copy other organisation’s behaviour, and 
since the network structure of Hizballah has increased the success of the organisation, others 
might want this too. This would mean that more terrorist organisations will be able to 
undermine the War on Terror, and especially the finance warfare that has been implemented 
to stop financial activities of terrorist organisations. It is thus suggested that the United States 
should look beyond its fear of Hizballah attacking American soil. It should rather fear the 
increasing contribution to its success that the organisation has established by creating 
financial ties with Latin America. In this case, the source of the success of Hizballah should 
be countered by establishing a new framework within the already existing finance warfare to 
give off a signal to other terrorist organisations that raising funds will no longer be as 
successful. However, further research into the framework of finance warfare and Hizballah is 
needed to come up with an effective countermeasure. But it is evident that the financial ties 
are of influence to the success of a terrorist organisation and thus need more intense 
monitoring. 
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